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The seven papers included in this special issue of Argumenta might be ideally 
divided into two parts. On the one hand, this issue collects four contributions 
dealing with some important topics in Philosophy of Mind and Philosophy of 
Language: the modularity of mind (the connections between the “pragmatic” 
module and epistemic vigilance mechanisms), the problem of perception and its 
link with action (the alleged anti-representational character of enactivism), the 
nature of phenomenal content (the plausibility of naïve realism in explaining the 
phenomenology of veridical visual experience), and the alleged irreducibility of 
consciousness (the claim that anti-physicalist intuitions are just a by-product of 
certain epistemological features of phenomenal concepts). On the other hand, 
there are three more contributions discussing some relevant themes in Logic and 
Epistemology: the actuality of the ancient Master Argument (its consistency and 
relationship with contemporary tense logic), the problem of evidence (the kind 
of evidence, psychological or non-psychological, intuitions actually provide), 
and that of counterevidence (the possibility that undermining defeaters, contrary 
to overriding defeaters, require the subject to engage in some higher-order epis-
temic reasoning). 
In the ideal first section, the paper “Pragmatics, modularity and epistemic 
vigilance” adopts the modular view of the mind and focuses on the connection 
between the pragmatics module and epistemic vigilance mechanisms, which 
filter the incoming information and assess the reliability, competence, and 
benevolence of the informer. The author, Diana Mazzarella, aims at showing 
not only that epistemic vigilance mechanisms may directly affect the compre-
hension process, but also that their emergence may correlate with different de-
velopmental stages in pragmatics. As to the problem of perception and its link 
with action, a successful approach is enactivism, a thesis which exploits the 
union of action and perception in order to claim that perception is direct, i.e. not 
mediated by representations. In “Enactivism, Representations and Canonical 
Neurons”, Gabriele Ferretti and Mario Alai question this inference arguing that 
even though the union of action and perception is well-confirmed by wide em-
pirical evidence in neuroscience, it can only be explained involving subpersonal 
representations. However, this would mean that perception is indirect, contrary 
to the enactivist’s conclusion. As to the nature of phenomenal content, naïve re-
alism claims not only that the phenomenology of veridical visual experience is 
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explained by acquaintance or perception, an irreducible mental relation between 
the subject and some environmental objects, but also that the visual phenome-
nology of veridical experience is wholly constituted by the environmental ob-
jects perceived by the subject. Takuya Niikawa’s paper “Naïve Realism and the 
Explanatory Role of Visual Phenomenology” aims to show that naïve realism is 
what best captures the explanatory roles of the phenomenology of veridical ex-
perience. Finally, the paper “Conscious Experiences as Ultimate Seemings: Re-
newing the Phenomenal Concept Strategy” presents the current versions of the 
Phenomenal Concept Strategy, which argue that anti-physicalist intuitions con-
cerning consciousness (especially that of conceivability) are just a by-product of 
certain epistemological features of phenomenal concepts. The author, François 
Kammerer, raises some questions against these versions of the strategy and de-
fends the idea that phenomenal concepts are concepts of unjustified justifica-
tions, or “ultimate seemings”.  
In the ideal second section, the paper “The ancient Master Argument and 
some examples of tense logic” discusses the Master Argument of Diodorus 
Cronus, which—being halfway between ancient logic and metaphysics—has 
been long debated by both logicians and philosophers. The author, Fabio 
Corpina, mainly deals with Prior's reconstruction, which marks the beginning of 
tense logic. More specifically, he evaluates and criticizes an argument by 
Øhrstrøm and Hasle trying to prove the inconsistency of the Master Argument, 
and then compares their strategy with that adopted by Prior. As to the problem 
of evidence, in “Williamson on the psychological view” Serena Maria Nicoli 
defends the classical assessment of intuitions according to which the nature of 
the evidence they provide is psychological. Against Williamson—who thinks 
that as the subject matter of philosophy is non-psychological, the evidence col-
lected by intuitions must be understood as non-psychological as well—she 
adopts a Wittgensteinian perspective on the aims of philosophy and argues that 
conceiving the subject matter of philosophy as conceptual does not necessarily 
amount to conceive it as psychological. Finally, in “Undermining Defeat and 
Propositional Justification”, Giacomo Melis discusses the problem of counterev-
idence. Defeaters can be understood as pieces of counterevidence: “overriding” 
defeaters give a subject S a reason to believe not-p while “undermining” defeat-
ers give S merely a reason to give up p. The author defends the idea that under-
mining defeaters, contrary to overriding defeaters, requires the subject to engage 
in some higher-order epistemic reasoning. In particular, he shows that this pro-
posal can be not only applied to doxastic justification, but also extended to 
cover propositional justification. 
